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To the author's mind the ideas of commonwealth organization and of imperial sanctity are incompatible. The religion of loyalty which has helped the people of Japan over the present crisis will gradually wane and Japan will then feel the need of a religious interpretation of life. He does not discover anything in Bushido, Shintatism or Buddhism which may be made the basis for a future regeneration of religious Japan. The solution he suggests is that Japan should come to appreciate the power and importance of the personality of Christ.

PAUL S. REINSCH.

University of Wisconsin.

Weale, B. L. P. *The Coming Struggle in Eastern Asia.* Pp. 640. Price, \$3.50. New York: Macmillan Company, 1908.

This volume makes more definite the author's reasons for regarding the Peace of Portsmouth and the second Anglo-Japanese alliance with dissatisfaction, if not, indeed, with distrust and apprehension. A year ago he qualified the general enthusiasm with which these instruments were received by the disconcerting statements of facts contained in "The Truce in the East and its Aftermath." The outlook has now become clearer, but even less assuring than before. The East is still on the eve of great events. The former book pointed to the possibility that the advance in China would come with sufficient rapidity to make a speedy recurrence of the events of 1904-05 improbable, if not impossible. Such a development now seems less to be relied upon.

Russia, still firmly entrenched on the north, is consistently pursuing her colonization policy, and even at the present time is "three or four times as strong in the Far East as she was in 1904." The grain fields and cattle farms of Siberia, with the control she possesses through the railway over the resources of Northern Manchuria, will put her in an increasingly strong position in future negotiations concerning Eastern Asia. The late war was for her only a preliminary skirmish. Japan's attitude is one of contradiction. Having tried to play up to the standard of a first-class power she now finds herself without the material resources or financial backing to keep up the part. Notwithstanding her position, in fact precarious, she is adopting a policy of aggression not only in Corea, but in Manchuria and China generally, which if unmodified, cannot but lead her again into international trouble. The attitude of all the agencies of her government is to observe the letter, but disregard the spirit of the engagements into which she has entered, guaranteeing the "open door." Her government is completely under the control of the bureaucracy, and can therefore carry on a far-sighted and consistent policy with much less difficulty than is possible in countries under true democratic control. Germany and France are unknown quantities, neither of them at heart disposed to give strong support to the doctrine of equal opportunity, and both determined to be ready for a share of the spoils, if the turn of events brings a division.

The author's attitude toward the recent agreements guaranteeing the

integrity of China is a double one. At times the extension of these guarantees to include Germany and the United States is urged, but most of the argument stigmatizes them as bad diplomacy, the end of which is to guarantee the powers against each other instead of working for the real advancement of China by aiding her to escape from her present anomalous international position. The satisfactory solution of affairs lies in the hands of England and the United States. The former is bound by the Anglo-Japanese alliance which the author considers a bad diplomatic blunder, but England could still accomplish much by insistence upon the actual rather than formal observation of the open door and the speedy execution of the Mackay treaties. The interests of the United States should prompt the adoption of these same policies, and in addition the republic should at once take steps to secure the predominance of its fleet in Asiatic waters. Neither of these powers is using at present the active diplomacy its interests should dictate.

The general tone of the book is one of disappointment and gloom. The criticisms are often directly opposed to those commonly passed on the same subjects in Europe and America, but the conclusions are reached by an acute observer of Oriental affairs and are based on statements of fact convincing and often startling, a fact which gives the arguments more than ordinary weight.

CHESTER LLOYD JONES.

University of Pennsylvania.

Wells, H. G. *New Worlds for Old.* Pp. vii, 333. Price, \$1.50. New York: Macmillan Company, 1908.

Not for a long time has the literature of socialism been enriched by a more reasonable and entertaining book than this. Though a convinced socialist, Mr. Wells is not obsessed of a formula; there are several things in the future about which he is not certain; his pages do not run red with the blood of those marvelous metaphysical creatures, capitalists and proletarians. It is all very strange and refreshing.

Instead of starting out with Karl Marx and the class struggle, Mr. Wells begins with what he calls the two main generalizations of socialism: First, "That the community as a whole . . . and every individual in the community . . . should be responsible for the welfare and upbringing of every child born into that community;" and, second, "That the idea of the private ownership of things and the rights of owners is enormously and mischievously exaggerated in the contemporary world." On these propositions Mr. Wells bases his arguments and they are rather hard to quarrel with in the moderate form in which he states them. Given this basis, then, social development becomes chiefly a question of method. In fact, the distinctive merit of this book is its insistence on the mental quality of socialism, the fact that it is a matter of expanding men's spirit of action and habitual circles of ideas, as the author put it.

With rare skill Mr. Wells takes up the most common objections to socialism. Then follow three historical chapters, outlining the ideas of